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11. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury case. The defendant slipped and fell at a hotel in Idaho 
Falls; there was no warning sign indicating the hotel floor had just been washed and was 
wet at the time Gallagher stepped on it and fell. 
The Plaintiff sued the party named as owning the property at which the Plaintiff 
fell, as that information appeared on the Idaho Secretary of State's website for assumed 
names, within the statute of limitations. Service upon the owner of the property, as that 
owner was listed with the Secretary of State, was also timely accomplished. When 
serving the listed owner, Plaintiff-Appellant Gallagher was informed the property had 
changed hands. Gallagher thereafter moved to amend the complaint to reflect the new 
owner, was granted permission and served the new owner. Defendant-Respondent 
Snake River Petersen Properties, LLC, alleges the amendment should not relate back to 
the original filing date, and the limitation period of six months should not be tolled, 
despite Gallagher's reliance upon the official record on file with the Idaho Secretary of 
State's office for assumed business names. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Plaintiff-Appellant Geralyn Gallagher filed a Verified Complaint for Damages and 
Demand for Jury Trial on July 9, 2014. During the six month period for serving the Defendants, 
while attempting to serve the Defendant Best Western Cottontree Inn and L & L Legacy Limited 
Partnership upon Scott Eskelson, the Plaintiff-Appellant was informed that the business had been 
sold. Plaintiff-Appellant filed a Motion to Extend Time for Service of Plaintiffs Complaint and 
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Summons and Affidavit of Allen H. Browning on January 8, 2015. The Court entered an Order 
on 15. 
15 was 
Defendants-Respondents Best Western Cottontree Inn and Snake River Petersen Properties, 
LLC, a ·wyoming Close Limited Liability on April 13, 2015. Defendants-Respondents filed a 
Notice of Appearance on April 27, 2015. The parties filed a Stipulation for Dismissal of L & L 
Legacy Limited Partnership, LLC with Prejudice on May 19, 2015. On May 21, 2015 the 
Defendants-Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, Memorandum in Support of the Motion to 
Dismiss in which they argued that the case should be dismissed as based on untimely service and 
that Plaintiff-Appellant's Amended Complaint should date back to the original filing on July 9, 
2014 when filed under I.R.C.P. I5(c). The Court entered an Order for Dismissal ofL & L 
Legacy Limited Partnership, LLC with Prejudice on June 4, 2015. Plaintiff-Appellant filed an 
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on June 5, 2015, in which Defendant-Respondent 
filed a Reply Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on June 19, 2015. A hearing on 
Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was held on June 23, 2015 in which the Court took the 
matter under advisement. Following that hearing the Court entered its Decision and Order re: 
Motion to Dismiss and Judgment on June 30, 2015 in which it dismissed Defendant-Respondent 
with prejudice. A Motion to reconsider was filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant on July 10, 2015 and 
Defendant-Respondent filed is Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration on August 
31, 2015. The Hearing on Plaintiff-Appellant's Motion to Reconsider was held on September 8, 
2015 in which the Court asked both the parties for additional brief before issuing a ruling. The 
Defendant's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration was 
filed September 15, 2015, Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Supplemental Brief was filed 
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September 21, 2015 and the Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's 
was 
to 
Motion to Reconsider. A Notice of Appeal vvas filed with the Court by the Plaintiff-Appellant on 
October 21, 2015. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 10, 2012, Plaintiff-Appellant Geralyn Gallagher was severely injured at a hotel 
in Idaho Falls, Idaho, located at 900 Lindsay Boulevard, named the Best Western Plus Driftwood 
Inn, aka the Best Western Cottontree Inn. The floor had been washed and was still wet, with no 
signs warning of a hazard (R., Vol. I, p. 7, L. 6-10). 
She hired Allen Browning to pursue her injury claim. 
A search was done with the Idaho Secretary of State to determine the legal owner of the 
Best Western Plus Driftwood Inn, the correct business name for the purposes of filing a lawsuit, 
and the registered agent for service of process (R., Vol. I, p. 13-18). The name of the business as 
registered with the Idaho Secretary of State was the Best Western Cottontree Inn; the owner was 
listed as L&L Legacy Limited Partnership. 
At the time of the accident, and unknown to the Plaintiff-Appellant Gallagher or her 
attorney, Best Western Cottontree Inn had been purchased by Snake River Petersen Properties, 
LLC, a Wyoming Close Limited Liability (hereinafter "Snake River") (R., Vol. I, p. 50 L. 13-23 
and p. 51, L 1-8). The hotel was owned and operated by Snake River at the time of the accident 
(R., Vol. I, p. 23-32), but there was no filing of this information with the Idaho Secretary of 
State. 
The Best Western Cottontree Inn was required under LC. § 53-504 to file a certificate of 
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assumed business name. There was on file the Secretary State's a of 
name that name at that auc.a"·"" and was 
as 
Inn and L&L Legacy Limited Partnership on July 9, 2014 (R., Vol. I, p. 15-18). Plaintiff-
Appellant had checked those records listed as "current" at the time of filing, and "L&L Legacy 
Limited Partnership" was listed as the only entity owning and operating this business at the time 
of the accident and subsequent thereto (R., Vol I., p 15-18). 
Because Plaintiff-Appellant's investigation revealed that the Best Western Cottontree Inn 
was owned and operated by L & L Legacy Limited Partnership at the time Mrs. Gallagher was 
injured, Plaintiff-Appellant filed her lawsuit against Best Western Cottontree Inn and L & L 
Legacy Limited Partnership on July 9, 2014, prior to the running of the statute of limitations. 
(R., Vol I., p. 6-10). 
A timely summons was issued for Best Western Cottontree Inn and L & L Legacy 
Limited Partnership, this is undisputed. During the six month period for serving the Defendants-
Respondents, a process server attempted to serve the Summons and Complaint upon Scott 
Eskelson, the registered agent for L & L Legacy Limited. Eskelson informed the process server 
the business had been sold, L&L Legacy was not the ovvner, and James Spatig was the current 
registered agent (R., Vol I., p 13-18 and p. 50, L. 13-23, p. 51, L. 1-8). 
On January 8, 2015, the Plaintiff-Appellant asked the court for additional time to 
determine who the new owner was, and his registered agent (R., Vol I., p. 11-18). 
The Plaintiff-Appellant was granted a 90 day extension of time to find and serve the new 
owner (R., Vol. I., p. 19-20). During that time, Plaintiff-Appellant amended the complaint to 
include Snake River and served a copy of the Complaint upon Snake River (R., Vol. I., p 21-35). 
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for first it was demonstrated that Snake River had purchased the hotel from L&L 
to the 
II. 
ISSUES 
1. Does the Plaintiff-Appellant Gallagher's amendment of her complaint relate back to 
the time of filing the original complaint? 
2. Did Defendant-Respondent Snake River's failure to file with the Idaho Secretary of 
State's Office prejudice Gallagher and therefore allow this complaint to relate back to 
the date of Filing under Winn v. Campbell, and toll the limitations period for serving 
the proper defendant? 
3. Because Plaintiff Gallagher actually found the name and address of the business 
which owned and operated the hotel at which Gallagher was injured, is this 
circumstance distinguishable from Ketterling v. Burger King? 
III. 
STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
In this case, the District Court granted summary judgment m favor Defendant-
Respondent Snake River, finding that under Ketterling v. Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 272 
P.3d 527 (2012), the service of the amended complaint naming a different plaintiff did not relate 
back to the original filing date and the time for serving the Defendant-Respondent was not tolled. 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review 
for an appellate court is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on 
the motion. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together the affidavits, that 1s no 
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genuine issue as to 
judgment as a matter of 
Winn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 
material fact and that the moving is entitled to 
. . 
1s no genuine 
an court 
728, 184 P.3d 852, 853, (Idaho 2008). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT RELATES BACK 
TO THE TIME OF FILING THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff-Appellant originally sued the Best Western Cottontree Inn as well as its former 
owner, L & L Legacy Limited Partnership. The Complaint was amended to keep the name of the 
business (which has not changed), and to name the current owner, Snake River Petersen 
Properties, LLC, because Defendant-Respondent Snake River hid its ownership from the world 
by failing to file a certificate of assumed name, as required by LC. Sections 53-504 and 53-509. 
The Rule of Civil Procedure concerning amendments to complaints is LR.C.P. 15, which states: 
(a) Amended and Supplemental Pleadings--Amendments. A party may amend the 
party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one to vvhich no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any 
time within twenty (20) days after it is served. Otherwise a partv mav amend a 
pleadin12: onlv by leave of court or bv wTitten consent of the adverse partv: and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires, and the court may make such order for 
the payment of costs as it deems proper. A party shall plead in response to an 
amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within ten (10) days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be 
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in 
all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the 
pleadings as mav be necessarv to cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of anv partv at anv time, even after 
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these 
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evidence would prejudice the party in maintaining the party's action or defense upon 
the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments.~=~~~~=~~==~==~~~ 
amended pleadirnz arose out of the conduct. transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the 
date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a 
claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the 
period provided by law for commencing the action against the party, the party to be 
brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action 
that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) 
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the 
proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. The relation back 
of an amendment joining or substituting a real party in interest shall be as provided 
in Rule l 7(a). The delivery or mailing of process to the Idaho attorney general or 
designee of the attorney general, or an agency or officer who would have been a 
proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with 
respect to the state of Idaho or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the 
action as a defendant. 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable 
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading 
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date 
of the pleading sought to be supplemented, whether or not the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief. If the court deems it advisable that the 
adverse party plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
It is clear the complaint may be amended at any time, and motions to amend are to be 
freely granted when doing so is in the interests of justice. 
The original complaint was filed within the statute of limitations, was served within the 6 
month period for service. Therefore, under Rule 15( c ), the amended complaint relates back to 
the date of service of the original complaint. 
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The controversy in this case concerns the effect of the Defendant-Respondent Best 
owner 
as as s 
attorney investigated and found the proper business name and address as reflected in the 
Secretary of State's official listing of assumed names and relied upon the accuracy of those 
records when filing and serving its complaint. 
B. DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT SNAKE RIVER'S FAILURE TO FILE WITH THE 
IDAHO SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE ACTUALLY PREJUDICED GALLAGHER 
AND THEREFORE THIS C01MPLAINT SHOULD RELATE BACK TO THE DATE OF 
FILLNG AND THE REOUIREMENT OF SERVICE WITHIN SIX flllONTHS SHOULD BE 
TOLLED UNDER WINN V. CAfllfPBELL. 
Defendant Snake River failed to file a certificate of assumed name with the Secretary of 
State's office when it began operating the Best Western Cottontree Inn. This violated LC. 
Section 53-504, which requires this be done: 
53-504. Filing of certificate required. (1) Any person who proposes to or 
intends to transact business in Idaho under an assumed business name shall, 
before beginning to transact business, file with the secretary of state a certificate 
of assumed business name in a form prescribed by the secretary of state. The 
form may be in any medium pern1itted by the secretary of state. The certificate 
shall be executed for the person by an individual who has actual authority to bind 
the person to legal obligations. 
Under Wait v. Leavell Cattle, the Court stated the purpose of that statute was to "[p]rotect the 
public against fraud and to give public information to persons who deal with those who conduct 
business under a fictitious name." 136 Idaho at 797, 41 P.3d at 225; Winn v. Campbell, 145 
Idaho 727, 731, 184 P .3d 852, 856 (Idaho 2008). 
Winn v. Campbell, supra, involved a person who had been injured in a hotel. The 
Plaintiff sued the wrong and listed a defendant which did 
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that at which the plaintiff been injured. Plaintiffs counsel had been mistaken 
was 
as not 
relating back and not tolling the limitations period for serving the correct defendant, finding the 
Plaintiff should have made a more reasonable search to determine the place of injury and the 
owner of the hotel. Winn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 184 P.3d 852 (2008). 
In Winn, the Idaho Supreme Court found the statute of limitations was not tolled because 
Plaintiff in that case did not conduct a proper inquiry as to the mvner of the business, and that the 
failure to file with the Secretary of State's office did not mislead the Plaintiff. However, it 
further stated that the tolling of the statute of limitations could have been possible, had Plaintiff 
sued the hotel in which she actually had fallen: 
This Court. however. has given some indication that tolling of the statute is possible. 
In Wait v. Leavell Cattle, the Court discussed Idaho's former assumed name statute and 
concluded that its purpose was to "[p ]rotect the public against fraud and to give public 
information to persons who deal with those who conduct business under a fictitious 
name." 136 Idaho at 797, 41 P.3d at 225. It concluded that the defendant's conduct in that 
case did not mislead the plaintiff in any way. Id. Therefore, the Court stated that the case 
did not provide a basis for holding that the statute of limitations should be tolled. This 
language, however, indicates that this Court mav somedav find a situation where 
tolling would be appropriate. 
Today, however, is not that day. This case, like Wait, does not provide a situation that 
might support a tolling of the statute of limitations. Winn failed to find out where her fall 
took place, and she sued the vvTong hotel entirely. The purpose of the Assumed Business 
Names Act is to ensure disclosure of the true names of persons who transact business in 
Idaho. LC. § 53-502. The consequences for noncompliance are found in LC. § 53-
509(1 ), which prohibits noncompliant parties from maintaining any legal action until they 
comply with the statute. LC. § 53-509(2) allows any person who suffers a loss because of 
another's noncompliance to recover damages and attorney fees. If Winn had filed her 
suit against Tumbling Waters Motet where she actuallv fell, her argument may 
have had merit because it appears as though Campbell, Inc., has vet to complv with 
the filing requirement for that hotel. Thus, had \Vinn attempted to sue the 
Tumbling ·waters Motel. she mav not have been able to find the correct partv to 
~- However, that is not the situation at hand. To toll the statute of limitations in this 
case would reward Winn for failing to take the simple step of finding out where she fell 
so that she could attempt to sue the correct party. 
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V. 1, 84 856 
at 
which she was injured, and she named the hotel listed with the Idaho Secretary of State. 
Plaintiff-Appellant Gallagher was actively misled by Snake River's failure to file its certificate 
of assumed name with the Idaho Secretary of State. Therefore, under the express reasoning of 
Winn and consistent with Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Gallagher's complaint should be allowed to 
relate back to the date of filing and the time for serving Snake River should have been tolled. 
This is the case anticipated by Winn, when it stated "this Court may someday find a situation 
where tolling would be appropriate." Winn v. Campbell, 145 Idaho 727, 731, 184 P.3d 852,856 
(Idaho 2008). 
C. BECAUSE PLAINTIFF GALLAGHER ACTUALLY FOUND THE NAME AND 
ADDRESS OF THE BUSINESS WHICH OWNED AND OPERATED THE HOTEL AT 
WHICH GALLAGHER WAS INJURED, THIS CIRCUMSTANCE DISTINGUISHES THIS 
CASE FROJ1 KETTERLING V. BURGER KING 
At the District Court, Defendant-Respondent Snake River urged that Gallagher's 
situation was more analogous to Ketterling v. Burger King, 152 Idaho 555, 272 P.3d 57 (2012). 
In Ketterling, the court considered whether the Plaintiff, injured at a Burger King 
restaurant, had been prejudiced by the failure of Defendant to file a certificate of assumed name 
with the Idaho Secretary of State's office. In Ketterling, the Defendant had not filed, there was 
no assumed name filing of record which would have confused the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff did 
not inquire further: 
In this case, HB Bovs' failure to file an assumed business name mav or may not have 
disadvantaged Ketterling. HB Boys had failed to file with the Idaho Secretary of State 
as a foreign limited liability company1 and therefore was not a "formally organized or 
registered entity" under LC. § 53-503(2). Thus, it was required under I.C. § 53-504 to 
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file a certificate of assumed business name. With no information to the contrary on record 
State, a customer of the Burley Burger King might, therefore, assume that it was 
operated by King. Indeed, Ketterling contends she was unable to 
ascertain the name of anv entitv, besides Burger King Corporation, registered with 
the Secretary of State to conduct business under the name "Burger King. 
does not dispute this assertion. Ketterling therefore argues that HB Boys should have 
filed a certificate of assumed business name of "Burger King." 
The district court was unmoved by Ketterling's argument because it determined HB Boys 
identity was readily available: 
The iclentitv and contact information for HB Bovs was reasonably available and 
- - - -
,,; .,; $0' 
ascertainable prior to the filing of the original complaint by virtue of the undisputed fact 
that such information was publically posted inside the Burger King restaurant in question, 
reQardless of whether HB Bovs was reg_istered with the Idaho Secretary of State. 
The district court's reasoning implies that HB Bovs failure to complv with LC. § 53-
504 did not disadvantage Ketterling since the identitv of the restaurant operator was 
readilv available for anvone who made inguirv. 
Ketterling v. Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 559, 272 P.3d 527, 531 (2012). 
Because the Plaintiff did not find the name and address of the Defendant filed with the 
Idaho Secretary of State, the Supreme Court affirmed a dismissal of the amended complaint 
naming the franchisee, finding the Plaintiff should have continued to investigate the identity of 
the ovvner of the Burger King restaurant, and should not have merely assumed that a lack of any 
filing with the Secretary of State meant the restaurant was owned by the larger corporation and 
not a franchisee. Ketterling v. Burger King Corp, 152 Idaho 555, 272 P.3d 527 (2012). 
The Ketterling case is quite different from Gallagher's situation. Gallagher had the 
proper address for the place of injury, and found that address listed in the official record on file 
with the Idaho Secretary of State, that it had been on file with that name and address for many 
years prior to the accident, and that it was "current" as of the time of filing the complaint. 
Gallagher relied upon the accuracy of the official record of the State of Idaho concerning filing 
of assumed names, and filed and served the Complaint and Summons based upon that 
information. 
If this Court were to find that Ketterling controls, it would be holding Plaintiffs should 
11 
never upon the accuracy of the official record of the State of Idaho concerning the filing 
be a name 
a at 
ownership information needed at the official state repository of that information, the Plaintiff 
must assume that information is worthless and he should seek his information elsewhere. 
Idaho law does not support that result. 
Idaho Supreme Court precedent does not support that result-Winn supports the ability to 
rely upon the Secretary of State's information made available to the public. Ketterling did not 
overrule Winn, it expressly affirmed what should happen if failing to file an assumed name with 
the Idaho Secretary of State misled a Plaintiff into serving the wrong party: 
in ¥Vinn we wrote that the discussion in Wait about assumed business names 
implied that noncompliance with the Act might preclude a business from asserting 
a statute of limitations defense, if the noncompliance misled the 
plaintiff. See Winn, 145 Idaho at 731, 184 P.3d at 856. 
Ketterling v. Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 558-559, 272 P.3d 527, 530-531 (Idaho 2012) 
Logic does not support granting summary judgment against Gallagher, as no one should 
expect the official state information is wTong. Further, Snake River urges that Gallagher had a 
duty to keep looking for the owner of the Best W estem Cottontree Inn after that information was 
found and confirmed on the Secretary of State's website as being current; that is absolutely 
illogical. 
Equity does not support granting summary judgment against Gallagher, as the confusion 
in this case was caused by Snake River, not Gallagher. Snake River desires to capitalize upon its 
ovvn error. Gallagher caused no confusion and merely desires to proceed and to allow Snake 
River to have its day in court. The harm in allowing the case to go forward is non-existent, as 
12 
~H-·F,"v· will have to establish the elements of her negligence action. The harm in granting 
to 1S no not 
own to 
obey the law. Snake River, in failing to file a certificate of business name, AND in allowing 
L&L Legacy Limited Partnership to remain listed as the current owner of the business, actively 
misled Gallagher regarding who owned the business. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
If Gallagher's amended complaint is not allowed to relate back to the original filing date, 
and if the time for serving the Defendant-Respondent is not tolled, the pronouncements of this 
Court concerning a Plaintiff who suffers prejudice by relying upon the official record of the 
Idaho Secretary of State when determining which party to sue and which person to serve would 
be rendered meaningless. All of the language in Wait, Winn and Ketterling concerning there 
being a distinct difference in result when a plaintiff relies upon the record \Vith the Idaho 
Secretary of State concerning the filing of an assumed name will be declared meaningless, and a 
plaintiff who followed the law and properly checked to make sure the proper party was sued and 
served within the proper time limits will be unjustly denied her day in court. 
DATED thi2.:s'dav of March. 2016. ~ . . 
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Steven R. Kraft 
P.O. Box 6756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Facsimile: 336-7031 
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